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For a long time historiography meant writing about the history of human beings. Whether it was about certain human beings and their interaction with others of their species, or how man slowly conquered their natural environment to create wealth and prosperity; the homo sapiens was almost exclusively the main character. Now, ‘thanks’ to developments such as global warming, diminishing biodiversity and pollution, the effects of man on nature, and vice versa, have become a central theme in scientific works. Especially the way nature influences the history of human beings has become a legitimate part of research. The debate between geographical and institutional explanations of economic development and underdevelopment is a well known example of this trend.
	Next to the emergence of nature as something that has a direct influence on how and when institutions are created, there has been another big change in historiography in recent decades. The often very Eurocentric way of looking at history, especially economic history, has given way to a more comparative approach.​[1]​  This approach often contrasts the economic character of areas such as China and India with the European Industrial Revolution, but puts them on equal footing. Especially the California School, with the likes of R. Bin Wong and Kenneth Pomeranz, show how China was on a different economic path, in stead of lagging behind Europe in its economic development.
	When these trends are combined something very interesting comes to life. Namely the field of comparative environmental history. Within this field of science deforestation plays a big role. This role is born mainly out of the ubiquity of wood in the pre-industrial economy. It was used as the main source for heating, cooking and building in all the big civilizations for centuries. The centrality of forests in the rise and decline of societies was recently restated in Jared Diamond’s Collapse.​[2]​ In his work, Diamond combines the geographical and institutional approaches to show how deforestation can destroy entire societies but also how certain societies can overcome this pending danger. This interaction between society and forests, in a comparative historical sense, is the driving force behind this paper.
	
	In the period leading up to the Industrial Revolution, England slowly made the transition from wood to coal, or from an organic to a mineral-based economy.​[3]​ J.W. Nef introduced the theory that this transition came forth out of the shrinking forests that marked the entire British isle.​[4]​ With the lack of nearby wood, and the automatic rise in price of this commodity, their was no other option than to replace this heat source with the cheapest and most abundant alternative; in the English case this was coal. This theory led to a wide discussion about both the cause of the eventual dominance of coal and the supposed shortage of wood. Although the thesis by Nef has lost a lot of its power, it does create some interesting questions, especially when it is combined with the ideas of Diamond.
	The big question derived from these two works is of course; how big is the impact of deforestation on the economy of a certain society? Diamond shows how and why cultures do or do not survive ecological pressure but he does not delve deeper into the economical side of all this. Nef on the other hand points to the environmental roots of economical development but keeps his thesis too simplistic and narrowly related to the introduction of coal. The middle ground between Diamond and Nef is a fertile area for research. By looking at the economical role of forests and deforestation leading up to the Industrial Revolution, a lot of different hypotheses and scholarly works can be tested at the same time. The comparative method of Charles Ragin, which will be explained further below, will be the central tool to create order out of all the historical data.
The two classical units of analysis of England and China are very well suited for the questions at hand. What makes these two cases so interesting is that they were two of the biggest economies before the Industrial Revolution, have cultural, but especially ecological differences that create a rich contrast and are the best documented areas. By comparing England and China in the period leading up to the English take-off, roughly from 1500 AD till 1800 AD, maybe a couple of sub questions could be answered along the way. Was there a strain on wood supplies in England that led to the adoption of coal? Was there an ecological problem in either England or China and did this lead to respectively an economical revolution or economical lag? And the big question at the end: which area was struck hardest by deforestation?
	To answer the question of how deforestation affected the English and Chinese economy two things need to be done. First an estimate has to be made of how important forests were for the economies in question. The, hypothetical, fact that China was being deforested more rapidly than England does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the Chinese economy was suffering more because of this ecological problem.​[5]​ By looking at the three big economical sectors; agriculture, industry and the household, and defining the role of wood in these sectors, a society-specific reaction to deforestation can be obtained. Agriculture is of importance because it was by far the biggest economical sector of the period in question. Industry plays a humble role, but is the catalyst for the Industrial Revolution and thus a key sector in the transformation of England. The third area, the households, is another big driving force because of its consumption levels. Of course, a quantitative assessment has to be made to eventually come to a conclusion which case was hampered more by deforestation. This is the second requirement that has to be met before one can reach a thorough conclusion.

An important side note that has to be made is one about the unit of analysis. To look at China as a whole is to overlook an immense field of differences. The same accounts even for a country the size of England. These geographical factors will play their part in terms of transport costs and the difference between economically developed areas and economically backward areas. Regarding China this work will be focused on the biggest economic region; the Yangzi-delta. This provides the best data, is best compared to England and is simply the most interesting part regarding economic development. 
	Before starting the analysis a small matter of methodology will be explained. The Ragin method will be succinctly stated and the problem with the different variables and parameters will be introduced. After this has been done, the debate so far will be revisited, from which a number of hypotheses will be extracted which can eventually be defined in terms of the Ragin method. The lessons learned from previous works, together with the comparative methodology, will then be applied in first a qualitative, and then a quantitative analysis of the two economies and their relation to deforestation.

Methodology




	 The main body of Ragin’s method is based on Boolean Algebra. This algebra is used to reduce intricate cases to a couple of variables. The combination of variables that describe the case can then be compared to others. Before looking at the advantages of this method it is essential to explain the workings of Boolean algebra in combination with historical comparative research.
	First, Boolean algebra uses binary data. A certain variable may be either present (marked as a “1”) or absent (“0”) in a certain case. The presence or absence of a variable in a certain case can also be marked with respectively an uppercase or lowercase letter. This might already cause a lot of friction with the archetype historian; a state is not simply democratic or not, industrialized or not, and so on. Although this type of categorization does entail some loss of information, those losses are to be kept to a minimum. Also, comparative historical studies often use variables that are very well suited to this nominal approach. The presence or absence of a revolution, a monarchy or a state church are examples of these.
	By defining a case in a number of variables this case can be reduced to a single string of letters. For example: case 1 = aBCd. This would mean that the case in question has a presence of both variable B and C and an absence of variable A and D. This case would then show a certain outcome, which is again either positive or negative. To use the same example: aBCd = E, which stands for a positive outcome. Together this would say that the presence of variable B and C, in combination with the absence of A and D create the presence of outcome E. By combining a number of these cases together a Boolean table is produced. In this table all possible combinations are mentioned and labelled with the matching outcome.
	The power of this method is that the table in question can be easily analysed. By using the rules for Boolean algebra the historic information will be reduced to a couple of combinations. In stead of explaining all the inner workings of this algebra, which is not very complicated but does take up a lot of space, a couple of useful tools will show the effect of this method. By simply looking at all the combinations and their outcomes it might become clear immediately that for every positive outcome (E, in our example) there is the presence of variable B. This would teach us that B is a necessary variable, for without it E would be impossible. Such a finding is very obvious, but even more complicated combinations are found easily with the algebra. This could eventually lead to the statement that E = aB * ABd * Cd, which would simply mean that outcome E occurs when A is absent and B is present, ór A and B are present when D is absent, ór when C is present and D is absent. These conclusions are very hard to reach using ordinary historiographic tools but pretty simple with Ragin’s method. At the end of all this, the somewhat abstract outcome can be translated back into historical reality.

Now that the Ragin method is explained it may have become clear that there is one big problem concerning this particular research. There are only two cases under scrutiny here in this work, but the method works best with a wide selection. This is true, but with a couple of side notes it will be clear that this method remains a very useful approach.	
	First, this method creates very insightful and easily accessible information. For example, the wide array of hypotheses and subquestions in this field of study can be reduced to simple Boolean terms. This makes them easier to asses at the end. The reduction of all this information into a couple of variables also creates a more user-friendly result. The results might be combined with other, similar, works and combined into a bigger pool of cases.
	This is the second big advantage. One has to look at this paper as simply part of a bigger whole. With similar researches done in other areas, all these works might be combined to create a big dataset. Especially when the same variables are applied this can eventually create a very insightful meta-work.

Variables and Definitions
	The aim of this paper is to find out how vulnerable the different parts of an economy are to deforestation. This vulnerability is very well suited for the binary approach explained above. The hypothetical variable “A” would stand for a fragile economical sector where “a” would describe the opposite. Although vulnerability is not a black and white case, c.q there are gradations, it is possible to define it as such in this particular paper. This definition will not be the same for every economic sector however. Before looking closer to this definition of vulnerability there is a second, intertwined, word that plays a central role; deforestation. In this perspective deforestation is simply the declination of forests in the region over time.
	So how does vulnerability get reduced to a simple vulnerable or not? It is a rather simple answer actually. For every different part of an economic sector there will be a commonsensical assessment. This means that behind all the variables and algebra there is still simple historical logic. The different variables that arise will be discussed in each section.	

The Debate(s) so far
	Before starting with the qualitative and quantitative analysis it is very educational to look at the debate so far. The first problem here may be that there is not really one single clearly defined debate, as there are in some fields of historiography. Rather there are a number of debates that are a part of the question posed in this paper and some debates that touch upon some of the relevant subjects. By summarizing the different theories and showing the weaknesses and strengths of the varying approaches a couple of tips and pointers can be distilled.

England’s forests
	The famous thesis by J.W. Nef is where the scholarly debate really came into existence, and thus a very good place to start. To restate his theory succinctly; a state-wide shortage of easily accessible and cheap wood led to the widespread adoption of coal in England. J.W. Nef reached this conclusion based on English price data in the 16th and 17th century. A sharp increase in the cost of wood led him to believe that all over the British island forests were disappearing rapidly.
This view has been supported and attacked over the last decades, but the fairly recent work of Robert C. Allen has been one of the clearest and most convincing responses.​[7]​ R.C. Allen takes the same data as J.W. Nef, the price data of the 16th and 17th century, and turns the timber crisis thesis upside down. Instead of a change on the supply-side he describes an explosive growth in demand.​[8]​ This new demand is rooted in the growing urban centres, mainly London, which create a very local shortage of wood.
	Two important points, relevant to this paper, have to be derived from Allen’s explanation. The first point is that rising prices do not automatically imply a problem on the supply side. Although this may seem trivial to even the worst student of economics it is something worth noting. A quantitative price index assessment has to be combined with at least a minimal form of demographics or something similar to reach thorough conclusions. The second point is related to the first and to the unit of analysis mentioned above. Simply put; there are more boundaries than just state boundaries. Again, this may seem trivial to some but is often overlooked. 

China’s forests
	One of the biggest authorities on Chinese environmental history is without a doubt Mark Elvin. Although a big part of his work is based on cultural writings he gives an interesting view of the Chinese attitude towards the environment.​[9]​ In his work The Retreat of the Elephants he eventually concludes that “…it seems likely that in late-imperial China the pressure on the environment … was much higher than in Western Europe overall around the end of the eighteenth century, and fairly probably somewhat higher than in England…”.​[10]​ Elvin reaches this conclusion without using any hard data, which makes it a somewhat weak argument. On the other hand he talks about the ecological effects of deforestation, such as erosion and climate change; something that hardly ever gets attention in economical works. What he provides eventually is a useful equation of ecological pressure.​[11]​ This equation, which will be mentioned below, gives an interesting way of handling the environmental problems and especially comparing different areas. 
	The lack of data in Elvin’s work is certainly not a problem for someone who argues quite the opposite; Kenneth Pomeranz. In his most famous work; The Great Divergence, he argues that Chinese forests were doing a lot better than their European counterparts.​[12]​ He does this at the hand of calculations based on population and cultivation data.​[13]​ This thesis can not be fairly measured against M. Elvin’s because they do not deal with exactly the same issue and M. Elvin does not give us exact data, but the colliding conclusion do provide an interesting dichotomy.​[14]​ Although K. Pomeranz does relate deforestation to economic consequences, he only does this marginally and rather superficial. The lack of wood is regarded as mainly a lack in fuel and other effects of deforestation are left unmentioned.

Ecology and Economy
	Jared Diamond’s Collapse is one book that has to be mentioned when talking about deforestation and the consequences for societies. In the same style as his Pulitzer prize winning Guns, Germs, and Steel Diamond tries to connect the development of societies with ecological parameters.​[15]​ One of the strengths of both these books is the fact that the writer is not a historian but rather a biologist with a passion for history. Because of this the data on which the argument of Collapse is based is a mixture of dendrochronology and archaeology based with biological and ecological knowledge. Methods and approaches that are hardly found in regular historiographical works. What makes this so interesting is the exposure of natural processes, such as erosion and changing rainfall, that may be the root causes of economical and cultural phenomena. For a lot of these deforestation plays a central part. Especially the pre-industrial economy, with agriculture as a major sector, is very sensitive towards these ecological changes and thus deforestation.
	The lack of economics in J. Diamond’s works does not undermine his argument. It does leave room for speculation though. A very interesting synthesis between ecology and economics is one provided by Richard G. Wilkinson in his Poverty and Progress.​[16]​ R. G. Wilkinson creates a very straightforward and easily readable theory about the causes of economic development, with the Industrial Revolution and the rapid American development as his two most eye-catching cases. Both these economic marvels are basically cultural responses to ecological pressures. “Development comes out of poverty, not out of plenty”, is the catch phrase of this book.​[17]​ The cultural response, in the case of the Industrial Revolution the adaptation of non-renewable energy sources for example, is not a Western quality but something that exists everywhere. Whenever a society is faced by a distorted ecological equilibrium there simply has to be a response. To take the Industrial Revolution as an example again; the shortage of wood, born out of a growing population and receding forests, demanded a response. Wilkinson claims that every form of economic and cultural development is actually a response to an ecological equilibrium.
	Such a geographically based theory, in contrast to institutional explanations by scholars such as Douglas C. North and David S. Landes, is of course far from accepted amongst historians. The geography versus institution debate is a very lively one and this paper will try to argue against the debate as a whole. 

Conclusion
	A lot has been written about deforestation, the role of wood in pre-industrial societies and the ecological foundation of economies. Putting these pieces together however has never been done in a satisfying way. The different works do supply some useful road signs for the further investigation of this matter. A quick recap leaves us with these conclusions:

-	Quantitative analyses are useless without a qualitative background.
-	There are more types of boundaries than only state boundaries.
-	Ecological phenomena play an important part in the pre-industrial economy.

With these pointers in mind it is time to turn to the qualitative analysis. The three economical sectors; agriculture, industry and the household, will be discussed in that order. The goal here will be to assess the impact of deforestation on the sector in question in both England and China. Important to note here is that it is not about the real impact of deforestation but rather the hypothetical impact. The numbers about deforestation, which will be calculated in the quantitative analysis, will be inserted later. There are two reasons to separate the real from the hypothetical. First it gives an insight in the economic role of forests that can then be easily applied to other areas. Second, any errors made by the author in one section will leave the other part unharmed.

Agriculture	
	Agriculture is the backbone of all pre-industrial economies. Without the artificial fertilizers, biological knowledge and modern equipment of today, the main factor for agricultural production before the industrial revolution(s) was available land. Still, ecological parameters played a huge role in food production, and thus the entire economy. A bad summer, or just some heavy storms, could destroy an entire harvest and leave a huge part of the local population starving. The Irish Potato Famine in the middle of the 19th century shows how strong an influence nature can be on human history.
	There are more subtle ways of nature’s influence on the domesticated plants however. Forests play a role when it comes to the pattern of rainfall in an area, erosion, purification of ground water and salinization. Most of these effects were unknown, or deemed unimportant because of short-term goals, in the peasant communities. It is these consequences of deforestation however, that are the most important to this study.
	Let us first look at the definition of vulnerability in this specific sector. Exact quantification of the amount of production lost due to soil erosion or changing weather patterns is impossible. The variety in factors that create the eventual production, and the lack of sophisticated information form the two biggest barriers. This means that a mathematic formula, such as Mark Elvin offers in The Retreat of the Elephant, can only serve as a rough guideline.​[18]​ To decide whether English or Chinese agriculture was vulnerable or not will have to be done in a more intuitive way. The commonsensical approach of the historian still remains his most important tool. 
	There are three ways for deforestation to have a strong impact on agricultural production. First there is erosion, which leads to a diminishing return of agricultural products over time. Second there is a changing local climate, or more specific; rainfall, which could create either the occurrence of heavy storms or a continuing drought. Third there is the purification power of trees, which means the purification of water in the sense of desalinisation. These three ways of influence, erosion, local climate and water purification will be discussed per area. 
The biggest difference between England and China, a difference that remains today, is the main crop. In England this was grain, in its many forms, while the Chinese got their daily dose of energy in the form of rice. The entirely different way of cultivating these crops creates a very interesting comparison. This brings up one interesting sub question: is either wet cultivation (rice) or dry cultivation (grain) more susceptible to the effects of changes in forestation levels?

England
	Erosion is the loss of the fertile topsoil of agricultural land. This process occurs almost everywhere but can become very dangerous when it reaches a certain level. There are a couple of factors that make up the intensity of soil loss. A well known method for calculating erosion levels is the Universal Soil Loss Equation. This method has a rather simple formula based on the relation between a couple of variables: A = RKLSCP.​[19]​ It is not necessary to deal with all six independent variables in depth, or to explain the formula and its inner workings any further. The relevant ones will be mentioned when discussed.
The first lesson here is that not only the variables where forests play an important role are of interest. Rather, the other factors, unrelated to deforestation, are the ones that deserve attention. Take the variable defined as C in the USLE method for example. This stands for the “cover and management factor”, something that differs strongly in China and England.​[20]​ This factor C is in fact a problem that can only arise once deforestation ensues. Forests are covering the underlying problem, you might say, and once you remove them, the characteristics of an area come to the forefront. Another great example in Collapse is that of Iceland. Once the vegetation was removed the new inhabitants of the island discovered that there was an ecological disaster waiting to happen there.​[21]​
The presence of forests play a crucial role in several variables. As said before, they play there role because of how they cover up an underlying potential problem. The roots of trees keep the soil together, provide cover from a burning hot sun and make sure the ground is moist enough. The effect forestry can have on local patterns of rainfall plays its part in erosion levels as well. England’s dry agriculture makes it quite prone to erosion. Windy, dry grounds, loose soil.
	The second variable is that of the weather. Haiti is an extreme example of how deforestation can lead to all sorts of ecological and economical problems, including decreased rainfall.​[22]​ England is not so vulnerable to changing weatherpatterns.
	The third variable defined in the beginning was that of water purification. Although it is mentioned here, and will be in the further analysis, it is too hard to calculate right now. More data is needed on the different soil types and the minerals in them, information which might never be recovered. Overall one might say that deforestation has a very bad effect on the water levels, purity and salinisation, but to be sure this variable will be filled with a questionmark.

China
	It is not necessary for rice to be grown in paddy fields, like grain it is suited for dry agriculture. By growing rice in flooded pieces of land a couple of advantage arise however. First, the never ending task of removing weed from the fields is dealt with because weeds can not grow on the flooded area. Second, the abundance of water has a positive effect on the growth rate of the rice.
	There are some notoriously negative effects surrounding the growing of rice in wet agriculture as well. A high production of methane, for example, and the need for nitrogen fertilizer to further increase production per field. Although these two effects are of no interest in relation to deforestation, they do show the importance of then unknown ecological processes.
	Now that there is a clear picture of the how and why of paddy fields it is time to address its relationship with deforestation. Starting with erosion; one obvious result is the diminishing loss by wind and gravity. Terracing on hills prevents the rolling of topsoil, and keeping the area flooded means that the wind has no sand grains to move. Wet agriculture keeps erosion in check and thus ensures no loss of productivity. At least, no loss of productivity through this natural phenomena.
	Although the Yangtze-delta itself is quite a flat region, it is surrounded by a quite mountainous region. This makes it a very enclosed region when it comes to the weather. People who have driven from Switzerland to Italy for example might have noticed how strong the weather can differ between the two sides of the Alps. The same thing applies, to a somewhat smaller extent, to the Yangtze-delta. This means that a big part of the rain that falls on this area of China is created in the same area. Every tree that is cut down thus means that there will be less rain in the future.
	This vulnerability is however bypassed by the Yangtze river itself. The river is over 6,000 kilometres long and is thus born far away from the cities of Shanghai and Nanjing. The loss of water because of severe deforestation would not be life threatening to the agriculture in this area. This is especially the case because wet agriculture depends less on natural rainfall, and more on irrigation and nearby water sources.

Conclusion
This is where the Ragin method first comes in. The information on the different types of vulnerability regarding to agriculture is given. It is a simple task to reduce the three factors to three variables. Whether an area is vulnerable to deforestation in the area of erosion (E), weather (W) and purification (P) will be marked with a capitol letter, meaning it is vulnerable, or a lower case letter, which means it is not. 
	




	This simple table reduces the information to only six variables, but this still is not enough. When all three economic sectors have been analysed this would lead to approximately nine (in reality six, but this will become clear later) variables, which means it would become rather chaotic. Even worse, when the cases of England and China would ever be supplemented with even more cases this would create an exponentially bigger mess. What is needed is an overall variable for agriculture; “A”.
	The next question that arises is: Do a one and a zero together make a one, or a zero? The answer here is that this overall variable calls for another commonsensical approach. Erosion was, and still is a very serious problem. Once lost it can not be regained, and eventually it will decrease the productivity of an area to zero. Especially problematic in pre-industrial times is that the problem might not be discovered until it is too late, and still then the question is whether people would find out how to solve it. The gravity of this problem makes for the combination of E and w to become A. The English agriculture is vulnerable to deforestation where the Chinese is not.





	Interestingly enough the English agricultural production rose steadily, and sometimes even rapidly, between 1500 and 1800. According to the figures of Robert Allen Total Factor Productivity even increased with a factor 1.8 in that period.​[23]​ This already gives an indication that forestation levels in England probably were not too bad. Either that, or the classification just made is faulted.








Talking about industry in the pre-industrial period seems somewhat comical. Although the quantitative role it plays in the overall economy of an area is indeed very limited, it plays a very important part in the development towards an industrial society. The very gradual development of steam-powered machines, which eventually came to represent the Industrial Revolution, shows how important pre-industrial industry is.​[24]​ Being somewhat alien to the medieval economy, and not knowing whether it would lead somewhere, the use of machinery and fossil fuels in order to increase production was an adventurous, and often costly, undertaking.
A quick explanation of what is meant by industry here is necessary before we continue. In some cases agriculture is seen as an industry, but in this pre-industrial sense it is about the secondary sector. It was this sector, that comprises mining and manufacturing for example, that increased rapidly during the Industrial Revolution.​[25]​
	So where is the connection between industry and deforestation? It obviously is not as direct as it is between agriculture and deforestation, but it certainly is present. The classic theory of coal replacing wood is one that still exists today. Thanks to Robert Allen it is even stronger than ever.
	Others forms of industry that defined the Industrial Revolution, such as the entire clothing production line, are left untouched by deforestation. At least, in a direct sense. If deforestation would have such drastic consequences for the economy of an area as a whole, other types of industry would automatically suffer. But this indirect form of reasoning is not a part of this research.

England
	So did England have an industry just waiting to be discovered? Yes, of course it did. But let it be clear that this does not mean that all England needed was a wood shortage to unleash an Industrial Revolution. All it means for now is that the development of a form of fossil fuel based industry was indeed susceptible to changes in forestation levels. This simply was so because wood is the closest rival coal has. The classic idea by J.W. Nef, that a wood shortage would lead to the adoption of coal, still stands in some way.

China
	It is now more than ever essential to restate that ‘China’ does not mean ‘China’ in this work. This term has been used to make it easier on both reader and author it stands for a certain area of China, the Yangtze-delta region. What typifies both areas is the lack of any easily accessible deposits of coal. The problem is that there is no other thing like coal, there is no other fossil fuel that could have been the basis of a Industrial Revolution. Although one might say that oil resembles coal in a lot of ways, it has one huge disadvantage for pre-industrial societies; it is so very hard to reach. Especially thát is what makes coal, and the English deposits of coal in particular, so special; all you practically need is a shovel.
	Without coal the Chinese could only count on one thing to reach extreme temperatures, charcoal. But this product, made by burning wood, is quite obviously very vulnerable to dwindling forests.

Conclusion
	The relationship between industry and deforestation is a very indirect one, which makes it a simple exercise for this particular work. A table with different variables is unnecessary here, only one variable (I for Industry) is of importance. To follow the idea that was also used for the agricultural variables, capitol letters are for vulnerability, lower case letters for the opposite. In this case this means that China is marked with an ‘I’, and England with an ‘i’. This indicates that the Chinese industry was strongly based on wood, while the English industry had a very suitable substitute in the form of coal.

Households
	The third and final economical sector under scrutiny is the most powerful one of the three. In the western economy of today the household plays its role mainly as a consumer. The pre-industrial household on the other hand, is as much a consumer as it is a producer. This makes it extremely crucial to the entire economy. You might even say that it ís the entire economy. There were no such things as multinationals, and speaking of something as a state before the 19th century is very questionable as well. The organization in Europe is the well known form of manorialism.​[26]​ However diverse this system was in some areas, it was always based on peasants offering a certain amount of their time to working the fields of their lords. Peasants produced on their own land, on their masters land and they were the main consumers.
	Before taking a closer look at the households in both China and England it has to be mentioned that this is not an economic sector in the sense that agriculture and industry are. When talking about households in this case it basically means people. Once the English and Chinese peasants came home from a long day of working the fields, what did they do, and what kind of supplies did they need to survive? Only the consuming capabilities of the household are at stake here. This is because much of the productive part of their lives are already mentioned in the section about agriculture.
	When taking away its role as a producer, the household retains a big role as a consumer of forest-related products. Trees are used for fuel, for cooking and heating, and as a construction material. In some cases the free foods found in dense forests were welcome additions to the daily meal as well. So when nearby forestation becomes scarcer a couple of problems arise. First, the free pieces of wood to light fires with will no longer be sufficient for the entire surrounding population, or at least take a lot more time to collect. Second, prices will go up and this will increase the cost of several timber-based constructions. Typical for this kind of vulnerability towards deforestation is that it is mainly based on whether there is a ready substitute or not.

England
	The English case is most famous for that one magical ingredient, coal. Without getting lost in the debate about the importance of coal for the eventual revolution there are still a few things to say. The main thing is that it was a very suitable and ready substitute for burning wood. Although it is not as easy as simply replacing wood with coal, there was such an abundance that a real shortage for heating and cooking is very hard to imagine. All the problems involved with making the switch from wood to coal are described in the aforementioned work by Robert Allen, The British Industrial Revolution in Global Perspective.​[27]​ 
	The second variable is based on the power of wood to be used as a construction material. Not only houses but also boats, mills and carts were made mainly of wood. Were there any substitutions for those? The answer is in most cases no. Boats, mills and carts were all made of logs of timber, and there was no satisfying substitute. This meant rising prices, and there was not much to do about it.

China
	Comparable to the well known story of coal in England is the story of beancake fertilizer. The beancake fertilizer features strongly in Pomeranz’ The Great Divergence, and shows the creativity of societies in need. A quick recap of this famous story will show that fuel was no problem for the Yangtze household as well. By applying beancake fertilizer to the fields, something that was imported from provinces up the Yangtze river, feces could be used as a fuel. The Chinese combined this with scraping up all the pieces of wood they could find, and using more efficient cooking and heating equipment. ​[28]​
	The Chinese had the same problem with rising prices of timber logs as did the English. Whether it was because of a growing population or strong diminishing forests the prices went up by 700%. This shows at least one thing, and that is that the price of construction minded timber was very inelastic in both China and England.

Conclusion
	For the second, and final, time all of this information will be reduced to a few variables. Because so far a positive variable meant that there was a vulnerability to deforestation this will be done no different this time. This means that when there ís a useful substitute for forests that counters any shortage, the variable in question will be marked with a lowercase letter. Although this may feel somewhat awkward it will make things a lot clearer and easier to work with at the end. For example; the presence of an English substitute for wood as a fuel, in the form of coal, means that England will be marked with an “f”. This should be translated as: England is not vulnerable to a shortage in fuel from the forests. Eventually this leads to the third variable in the overall vulnerability-equation: “H” for Household.
	Both countries seemed to be able to deal quite well with diminishing wood for fuel, although the English were on a more sustainable path with less consequences for their lifestyle. Since timber as a construction material was something that could hardly be substituted in both areas they tie there as well. Eventually this leads to the conclusion that deforestation would be something of a bother, and a strain on finances and living space, but an overall vulnerability is not there in both cases.






	The hypothetical effect of deforestation on the pre-industrial economies of China and England are clear now. This automatically raises the question of the real effect, and thus the real deforestation levels in both areas. The forests of England have received a fair amount of attention over the last couple of decades, mainly because of the relationship with coal and the Industrial Revolution. For this area a short reference to R.C. Allen will suffice. China is a different case however, this will be discussed further below. 

England
	There was never a real problem with deforestation in England, as R.C. Allen shows convincingly. The problem that arose was the high urbanization rate in especially London. Because deforestation was under control, it was possible for the English agriculture to keep increasing its production and feed a growing population. The findings of a vulnerable agriculture, in combination with constantly growing TFP and a rising population all coincide with these figures.

China
	This is where the biggest problem of the work arises, the lack of data on Chinese forests. The Chinese are on a path of rapid development, also when it comes to their own history. But English works, on topics relevant to the western style of historical writing, are still quite rare. For the Yangtze-delta, and Kanton, there are some price lists available, however these do not start to get interesting till the middle of the 18th century. More encompassing price lists could give at least an impression of the fluctuation of the Chinese forestation levels.
Another way of reconstructing the history of Chinese forests is through dendrochronology, or tree-ring dating. This tool is employed by Jared Diamond in a fascinating and refreshing manner.​[29]​ On the contrary to the approach taken by Diamond is the aforementioned work by M. Elvin. Although M. Elvin’s The Retreat of the Elephants is a well written book, one that is a pleasure to read, it is hardly convincing. The complete lack of hard data shows that it is sometimes better to accept gaps in historical knowledge and leave them aside.
A third way of generating Chinese data has been performed by K. Pomeranz. By looking at the use of land he calculated what area would remain for forests.​[30]​ The problem is that he calculated numbers for the 18th century as well. Next to this he uses quite speculative methods and talks about other regions than the Yangtze-delta. When the choice has to be made between using these kinds of figures to make conclusion or completely refrain from them, it might be tempting to do the first but this creates a dangerous precedent. Once this kind of data becomes published others tend to copy it without fully mentioning all the modifications behind it. 

Conclusion
No interesting comparison is of yet possible, that much is clear. But although the introduction of this paper stated that the direct economical effect of deforestation was the only point of focus, it would be foolish to completely ignore some other consequences. This is especially true with the insight that hard data is not yet available. 
	An interesting side question is that of the causes of deforestation. The level of deforestation can have a number of causes, some of them being interrelated with deforestation and its effects as well. The technique of building terraces on steep hills, for example, means that even less territory is left for trees to grow. So on the one hand do terraces play a role in the defence against deforestation, but on the other hand does it mean that forests get pushed back even further. The far more labour-intensive way of producing food by the Chinese means that that society will need more land per capita to sustain its population. This again leads to less space for vegetation. A cultural explanation, as M. Elvin puts forward quite strongly, can play a role as well.​[31]​ Again, all these factor play no role in the direct economical effect of deforestation, but are something to be kept in mind while thinking about this subject. Eventually, all that is discussed here is a part of a bigger causal sequence, one in which the causality is not even clear.
Analysis
The Data
	Now that both the qualitative and quantitative questions have been handled it is time to put all of this together. A quick recap gives these three tables:













	It is now only a small step to create the string of variables that defines the overall vulnerability of both areas. This small step is not an easy one however. China has the Boolean string of variables ‘aIh’, England has ‘Aih’. Both have one weakness, England in its agriculture productivity and China in its ability to develop its industry, is one more vulnerable than the other?





	The best solution here is to refrain from defining either one of them, mainly because there is a somewhat philosophical question. Until now it was easy to say that a certain economic region was vulnerable because the goal of that region was clear. In the case of agriculture it was improvement, or at least stabilizing, of agricultural production, the same goes for industry. When taking a look at an entire economy it becomes a somewhat more normative question. Does the Chinese economy fail when it does not go through an Industrial Revolution? Or does the English economy fail because it could not continue on the path it was on? These question do not belong in this section, they will receive attention, but that will be done by using some hypotheses of other scholars.

The Hypothesis
	A couple of hypotheses have been mentioned in the introductory remarks. Especially because of the lack of hard data on the Chinese deforestation none of them will be answered, but one example will be discussed shortly in order to make a statement. Remember to keep in mind that there is a gap in the data for these two regions, and that there are many more regions that should be added to this Boolean table to make it really significant.
	The hypothesis is that by R.G. Wilkinson. His central remark: “Development comes out of poverty, not out of plenty” does not fit the current picture. England developed towards an Industrial Revolution but did not do this out of a forest-poverty. This is deceptive however, as R.C. Allen showed. There is not so much a problem on the supply side, but there is a very strong, local, increase on the demand side. With some goodwill this can be seen as an ecological equilibrium, as R.G. Wilkinson also calls it.
	This first hypothesis immediately shows that only looking at deforestation creates a distorted picture, but it does not dismiss this exercise at all. The aim of this paper was never to explain the Industrial Revolution, or to proof any of these hypotheses wrong. The only goal was to compare the effects of deforestation on the economies of the two areas, and thus create awareness of the role it should play in further research.

The Main Question





How big was the impact of deforestation on the Chinese and English economies of the 16th till 18th century? To reach the answer to this question it was divided in two questions, a qualitative and a quantitative part. In the qualitative section the hypothetical vulnerability of three economic sectors was explored. The agricultural section showed that England was in potential the more vulnerable of the two. Especially when it came to erosion the English environment and its mode of production were fragile.
The relationship between deforestation and industry was not as direct as was the case with the other two economical sectors. It is still important to mention it however, and to restate the importance of the easily accessible coal deposits in England. This is especially telling when compared to the utter lack of those deposits in the economically vibrant Yangtze-delta.
Households in both China and England were vulnerable to the changing price of timber as a construction material, but their ability to heat their houses and cook their meals was never in real danger. At least, as long as there was no strong demographical shift, as there was in England.
The second part, the quantitative analysis, was simply disappointing. The lack of data for especially China means that it is better to say nothing at all, rather than to digress in philosophising and guessing. This leads to a very important learning point however; the power of data. Not only man-made sources, but also sources that nature leaves behind should be tapped into more by historians. New tools, or even better, cooperation with those who already have those tools, are required to reach a higher level of understanding. 
		In this effort to look at only one small piece of a huge puzzle, the other pieces still kept popping up. These occurrences tell us that history as a scientific subject is something completely different than chemistry, physics and even economics. There are no controlled experiments, no cases with ceteris paribus. The pieces of the puzzle are all connected to each other and are useless in themselves. Making use of the different pacific isles, which created differing environments inhabited by one relatively homogenic culture, as Diamond did, is probably the closest historians will get to pure scientific research. But even though the approach taken in Collapse blends historical information with scientific tools, the gaps remain bigger than the outcome.
	This does not mean that historians should give up of course. It just means that they should be more creative in their approaches, learn from other scientific fields to fill the gaps as reliably as possibly, and, most important, work together.
	Throughout this paper there were some remarks regarding the consequences and causes of deforestation. There was a good reason to do so. There were even three good reasons to do so. First it showed how interrelated deforestation is with the economical and cultural features of a society. Those different topics, often researched by different kinds of historians, are so much more telling once it is accepted that they all fit together. This evidently means that the dichotomy of geography and institutions is a false one. The question is not which one rules the economy, it is how they work together.​[32]​
Second, which is related to the first reason, it showed that it is impossible to look at deforestation without taking into account those other aspects of a society, but that that also works the other way around. Economies and cultural aspects are defined, in different gradations, by their natural environment. This means that cultural historians, economical historians, social historians and so on should all keep in mind that there is more to history than their respective parts.
	The third and final reason to keep thinking about the consequences and causes that lie just outside of the main question is an ideological one. When confronted with the immensity of such a subject one comes to the conclusion that it is too much to do alone. The community of historians does make use of each others works and data, but it still focuses on individual projects. The intention is hardly ever there to add a little bit of insight or data to a big bank of historical knowledge. Even the simple sharing of a dataset is something that is still more an exception than a rule.
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